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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature 0f the Case

A.

This case involves a legal malpractice action arising from legal services provided by

Respondents Swapp Law, PLLC, d/b/a Craig Swapp

&

Associates (hereinafter

“CSA”) and

Stephen Redd to Appellant Sharon Walsh, in connection With two motor vehicle accidents that
occurred in 2013. The ﬁrst accident occurred on February
struck in the rear

2013,

when Ms. Walsh’s vehicle was

by a vehicle operated by Troy Hansen, while she was stopped

The second accident occurred three months
to turn in front

8,

later,

0n May

7,

2013,

at

an intersection.

when Donald Lamott attempted

0f Ms. Walsh as she was approaching an intersection and collided with her vehicle.

Ms. Walsh

initially

commenced

this action

on March

2,

2017.

She ﬁled an Amended

Complaint 0n June 20, 2017, asserting causes 0f action based 0n allegations

Redd mishandled her February 2013 and May 2013

accident claims.

that

CSA

and Mr.

The damages Ms. Walsh

sought related primarily t0 Mr. Redd’s and CSA’S alleged negligence in failing to appropriately
investigate her claims pertaining to injuries sustained in the February

negligently

recommending

the settlement of her February

After written discovery and several depositions,

summary judgment on
statute

0f limitations

2013 accident, and

2013 accident claim.

CSA

and Mr. Redd ﬁled a motion for

July 13, 2018, asserting Ms. Walsh’s malpractice action

set forth in

Idaho Code

§ 5-219(4).

CSA

was barred by

and Mr. Redd argued

that

the

Ms.

Walsh’s malpractice cause 0f action accrued when she entered into a settlement 0n February

5,

2015, releasing her injury claims arising out of the February 2013 accident; and the ﬁling 0f her
lawsuit 0n

March

2,

2017 was beyond the two-year period of limitations provided by Idaho Code

§ 5-219(4).

Ms. Walsh opposed the motion, arguing

the claims arising from her second

May

2013 accident were

accrual 0f Walsh’s cause 0f action until she

5-219(4) applied t0

District

on March

2,

that

under each

2017 was timely. After a hearing, the District

Court denied; and

3,

2018. Ms. Walsh ﬁled a motion for

this appeal followed.

Notwithstanding the discussion 0f issues presented 0n appeal in Ms. Walsh’s
focus 0f this appeal and the decision to be

questions:

(1)

made by

Supreme Court concerns primarily two

CSA and Mr. Redd accrued on February 5, 2015, When Ms.

release in settlement of her injury Claim against

and

the

brief, the

whether the District Court correctly held that Ms. Walsh’s cause 0f action for

malpractice against

accident;

toll the

was informed 0f a potential malpractice claim by her

Court granted CSA’S and Mr. Redd’s motion 0n October

Which the

§

until

October 2017, and

0n or about March 25, 2016. Ms. Walsh argued

scenario, the ﬁling ofher cause of action

reconsideration,

0f action did not accrue

fully resolved in

by Idaho Code

the fraudulent concealment exception provided for

current counsel, Kristian Beckett,

that her cause

(2)

Troy Hansen

Walsh executed

arising out of the February 8,

assuming the fraudulent concealment exception in Idaho Code

§

a

2013

5-2 1 9(4) applies

under the circumstances 0f this case, whether the District Court correctly held that Ms. Walsh did
not ﬁle her cause 0f action against

CSA and Mr. Redd Within one year 0f When she knew, 0r in the

exercise 0f reasonable care should have been put

CSA

and Mr. Redd submit the

these questions

in favor

was

correct,

0n

inquiry, regarding her malpractice claim.

District Court’s analyses

and conclusions with respect

t0

each of

well-grounded in the applicable law, and the District Court’s judgment

0f CSA and Mr. Redd as a matter of law should be afﬁrmed.

Statement 0f Facts

B.

Walsh’s Iniurv Claims, Retention 0f CSA and Settlement 0f Her
Claim Arising From the Februarv 8, 2013 Accident

1.

On

February

8,

2013, Appellant Sharon Walsh was injured in an automobile accident,

Which occurred When a vehicle operated by Troy Hansen struck Walsh’s vehicle
she

was stopped

at

an intersection. (See R, pp. 131-136.) Three months

Ms. Walsh was injured

in a

later,

in the rear While

on

May

7,

2013,

second collision with a vehicle operated by Donald Lamott. (R, pp.

138-144.)

Following the second accident, Ms. Walsh contacted

On

represent her With regard t0 her personal injuries.

June

3,

CSA

and retained the law ﬁrm

2013,

CSA

Ms. Walsh and she executed a Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement. (R,

was

assigned t0 attorney Paul Swainston, with Mr.

initially

opened a case ﬁle for
p. 146.)

Walsh’s case

Redd working under Swainston’s

supervision as a settlement negotiator. (R, pp. 148-149; R, p. 93 (Depo. 0f P. Swainston, 95:5

9614).)

Through an

internal

ﬁrm reorganization

in

96:7; 96:19

On

—

Swapp’s supervision. (R,

97:16; 101:23

—

—

September 2014, Craig Swapp took over from

Mr. Swainston as the supervising attorney 0n Walsh’s ﬁle, with Mr. Redd continuing
the ﬁle under Mr.

t0

p. 128;

to

work on

R, pp. 93-95 (Depo. of P. Swainston, 95:23

—

102:13).)

April 30, 2014, Mr.

Redd submitted

a Statement of Claim on Walsh’s behalf to Troy

Hansen’s insurer, American National Property and Casualty Insurance Company (hereinafter

“ANPAC”),
payment

offering t0 settle Walsh’s claim pertaining t0 the February 8, 2013 accident for

in the

amount of $16,500.00.

(R, pp. 151-152.) In January 2015,

ANPAC

extended an

payment

offer t0 settle the case for

agreement t0

satisfy

to

Ms. Walsh

amount 0f $8,000.00, plus ANPAC’S

in the

an outstanding medical payment lien in the amount 0f $5,000.00. (See R,

154 (1/5/2015 note entry).) Mr. Redd discussed the offer With Ms. Walsh on February

and Walsh authorized the settlement.

conveyed acceptance 0f the offer

On
February

February

8,

the agreed

for

its

forwarded a

agreement t0

2.

letter to

The Release of A11 Claims conﬁrmed

p. 160.)

payment t0 Ms. Walsh

satisfy the outstanding

ANPAC

(1d,)

2015, Ms. Walsh executed a Release 0f A11 Claims pertaining to the

upon settlement

conﬁrming

ANPAC the same day.

2015,

Mr. Redd

(R, p. 158 (note entry 2/4/2015, 2:44 p.m.).)

2013 accident with Troy Hansen. (R,

agreement t0
2015,

5,

to

4,

p.

in the

amount 0f $8,000.00, plus ANPAC’S

medical payment lien of State Farm.

(Id.)

On

February

6,

enclosing a check in the amount of $8,000.00 and

CSA,

satisfy the outstanding

medical payment

lien.

(R, pp. 162-163.)

Walsh’s Pursuit 0f Her Iniurv Claim Against Donald Lamott Arising
From the Mav 7, 2013 Accident and Her Attornev-Client Relationship
with Kristian Beckett.

Following her settlement with Troy Hansen and
her claim arising out 0f the

CSA

May

7,

2013 accident involving Donald Lamott.

continued to pursue

On April

29, 2015,

ﬁled a lawsuit on behalf of Ms. Walsh against Donald Lamott for negligence related to the

May 7, 2013

accident. (R, p. 528. See also

Court Case No. CV-PI-2015-7302.)
Beckett,

for

ANPAC, Ms. Walsh

10).)

v.

Donald Lamott, Ada County

In June 2015, Ms. Walsh’s case

who had recently joined CSA

Admission N0.

Sharon Walsh

as

an associate attorney. (R,

p.

was assigned

District

t0 Kristian

106 (Response t0 Request

Ms. Walsh testiﬁed by afﬁdavit
judgment
that “it

that the ﬁrst time she

was not a good idea

litigation

where there

is

in response t0

met with Mr. Beckett

t0 settle

an overlapping injury.” (R,

In June 2015, as well as July or

Swapp,

that

CSA’S

ofﬁces, Mr. Beckett informed her

it

p.

334

11

would be

48.)

is still

Mr. Beckett further informed

difﬁcult to deal With. (1d,)

CSA had committed malpractice by settling Ms.
1,

2016 email

t0

Walsh’s February

Mr. Swapp, Mr. Beckett, referring back

June 2015 communication, wrote the following:

remember

soon as I go [sic] this ﬁle in June 2015 I
called and expressed my concern that the ﬁrst claim was settled. My
ﬁrst inclination was that there was malpractice 0n the ﬁle. T0
me separating a claim that creates an empty chair is malpractice.
The only way to avoid it being malpractice is if there is a clear
indication from the client that they want t0 settle the claim. If the
If

you

client

Will

wants

as

to settle the case

it is

imperative to paper the ﬁle.

It is

0f
up t0
the client. But the client is paying an attorney for information and
advice. We as attorneys have an ethical obligation t0 communicate
the best practice to the client. The clear best practice in this situation
our responsibility as attorneys to inform the client of the

their claim.

was

realities

The ultimate decision on what to do with a case

is

to take both cases into the litigation process. I believe that

by
bv settling the ﬁrst claim that the
second claim would be damaged 0r impaired was malpractice.
The client approved the
There was no such warning given.
settlement based 0n the advice of her attorney. The client trusted
the law ﬁrm to provide good advice and we did not give good
failing to

advice.

inform the

pending in

August 2015, Mr. Beckett believed, and openly expressed

2013 accident claim. In a lengthy April
to his

in

one of two claims Where the other claim

her that there would be an “empty chair” and that

his belief t0 Craig

CSA’S and Mr. Redd’s motion for summary

client that

(R, p.

469 (emphasis added); See also R,

p.

417 (Depo. 0f C. Swapp 105221 — 106219 (wherein

through his questions Mr. Beckett acknowledges that there had been a prior conversation between

he and Mr. Swapp regarding potential malpractice)).) Mr. Beckett continued in his next paragraph:

measure 0f the malpractice was realized when the IME
I hired, Dr. Tyler Frizzell, noted Boise neurosurgeon
provided the following opinions; the second collision was the
proximate cause 0f the disc herniation which protruded t0 cause
nerve root symptoms. The medical treatment was reasonable and
necessary. Ms. Walsh sustained a permanent impairment and 0r
permanent partial disability rating 0f 19% attributable t0 her injuries
Dr. Frizzell rated the
present at the time of the evaluation.
impairment at 16% related t0 the second collision with the
remainder apportioned t0 the ﬁrst. Dr. Frizzell also states that the
apportionment of medical costs should be 15% of the medical bills
following the second collision are proximately related t0 the
February 2013 collision.

The

full

doctor that

.

.

.

Given the reality that there is a substantial likelihood that the defense
will point to the empty chair unless that was clearly discussed with
the client the ﬁrm committed malpractice. I don’t see anything in
the ﬁle that indicates that this client was pushing to get this
settlement money. Idon’t see anything in the ﬁle that indicates this
client was ever informed that this practice would harm her second
collision claim.

Mr. Beckett also prepared and ﬁled With the District Court a proposed Second

(R, p. 469.)

Amended Complaint on

behalf 0f Ms. Walsh, in Which

factual allegations in the

personally informed Mr.

there

2016 email

t0

trial

was acknowledged through

additional

proposed complaint that “[i]n July 0r August 0f 2015, Mr. Beckett

Swapp

that

he believed that

it

could be malpractice t0

was a second case With overlapping damages; and

an empty chair for

it

0n the second claim.” (R,

p.

that the

188

1]

settle a

same was tantamount

case

when

to leaving

171; See also R, p. 472 (March 30,

Mr. Swapp from Mr. Beckett stating “You and

I

talked about

my

concerns with

settling a

claim Where there

concerns have

come

medical treatment on

The defense spent

is

an open claim pending right

t0 fruition.

I

sent this client to an

at leat [sic] 1/3

IME

May 7,

2013

2013

(R, p. 188

collision.

has apportioned

collision,

and

85%

It

to represent

15% 0f the

medical care and

0f the medical care and

total

total

expenses t0 the

until

he terminated his

CSA, Mr. Beckett continued

Donald Lamott. (Id) Ms. Walsh ultimately

her action against Mr. Lamott for payment of the
full

Ms.

Beckett received Dr. Frizzell’s report on

(R, p. 529.) After departing

in her lawsuit against

0f $100,000.00, plus the

in

W 174-175.)

CSA in April 2016.

Ms. Walsh

My

15% 0f her

was acknowledged

Mr. Beckett managed Ms. Walsh’s case from June 2015

employment with

file.

3% permanent impairment as well.

(See R, pp. 475-483.)

Amended Complaint that Mr.

8,

transferred this

opinion which Mr. Beckett was referring t0

February 22, 2016; and in the report Dr. Frizzell attributed
expenses t0 the February

was

of a four hour deposition 0n the prior collision”).)

messages was February 22, 2016.

Walsh’s proposed Second

I

IME who

claim to the ﬁrst collision as well as

this

Notably, the date of Dr. Tyler Frizzell’s
in these

after

full

amount of Mr. Lamott’s

amount of the underinsured motorist policy

Which was available under Walsh’s own automobile insurance

liability

limit

settled

policy limit

0f $100,000.00,

policy, for a total

amount of

$200,000.00. (See R, p. 106 (Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 6-9); See also R, p. 102

(Answer

t0 Interrog.

N0.

Lamott was dismissed

10).)

These settlements were ﬁnalized and the lawsuit against Mr.

after the present action

was

ﬁled,

0n October

12,

2017. (R, pp. 114-1 17.)

The Filing 0f Walsh’s Legal Malpractice Claim and Foundation
Her Alleged Damages

3.

Ms. Walsh’s
ﬁled on March

2,

(R, pp. 24-43.)

complaint in

initial

2017. (R, pp. 8-23.)

this

malpractice action against

and Mr. Redd was

On June 20, 2017, Walsh ﬁled a First Amended Complaint.

Amended Complaint

Plaintiff’s

CSA

for

included various allegations of mishandling by

CSA and Mr. Redd with regard to Walsh’s February 20

1

3

and May 20 1 3 accident claims; however,

her allegations and causes 0f action primarily related t0 Mr. Redd’s handling 0f her claim

concerning the February

8,

2013 accident. (See R, pp. 36-42 1N 144-187.) Moreover, as noted

above, Ms. Walsh’s lawsuit against Donald Lamott arising from the

and dismissed on October
for

damages

12, 2017.

With

the Walsh

in her malpractice action against

alleged negligence surrounding claims that Mr.

Walsh’s claims pertaining

recommended
Walsh

she

Redd and

0n appeal

that she

Walsh

v.

Lamott

litigation

made numerous

CSA’S and Mr. Redd’s
had

settled, as

Ms. Walsh’s claim

appropriately investigate

February 2013 accident, and negligently

CSA and Mr. Redd subsequent to February 5, 2015
t0

settled,

CSA failed t0

the settlement of her claim pertaining to the February

conﬁrmed when responding

after the

Lamott action

and Mr. Redd became focused entirely 0n

t0 injuries sustained in the

asserts in her brief

committed by

CSA

v.

May 20 1 3 accident was settled

2013 accident. While Ms.

allegations of negligent actions

(see Appellant’s Brief, pp. 6-7),

written discovery requests, answered

well as in post-settlement correspondence to

counsel for Blue Cross 0f Idaho, that the touchstone of her malpractice claim was damages
allegedly sustained as a result 0f Mr. Redd’s and

CSA’S negligence

in handling

recommending the settlement of her February 2013 accident claim. (See R,

and prematurely

pp. 80-83 (discussing

Walsh’s answers

t0

and requests for production of documents, as well as

interrogatories

correspondence t0 Blue Cross of Idaho counsel, conﬁrming the gravamen of her lawsuit against

CSA

and Mr. Redd concerned alleged malpractice

February

8,

at the

time Mr. Redd and

CSA

settled her

m

2013 accident claim).)

4-

In sum,

Ms. Walsh’s damage claim

in this case is focused

0n the amount she believes she

should have recovered as a result 0f injuries sustained in the February 2013 accident, but forfeited

due

to the alleged negligence

0f

CSA

and Mr. Redd

settlement of her claims arising out 0f that accident.

commence her

action against

CSA

in investigating

and recommending the

Ms. Walsh, however,

and Mr. Redd Within two

(2) years

failed to timely

0f the date 0n Which she

released her injury claim pertaining t0 the February 2013 accident. Ms. Walsh’s rights pertaining

to her

February 2013 accident claim became ﬁxed 0n February

ANPAC.

Troy Hansen and

release in favor of

0f action for legal malpractice against

Mr. Redd, ﬁled on March

2,

this case also establish that

219(4) applied t0
barred.

toll

if the

the accrual 0f

2015,

Consequently, that

is

CSA and Mr. Redd accrued.

2017, was

even

5,

commenced more than two

When Walsh executed the

the date

on which her cause

Her lawsuit

against

years thereafter.

The

fraudulent concealment provision found in Idaho

Ms. Walsh’s claim, her cause 0f action

still

CSA and
facts in

Code

§ 5-

remains time-

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether Respondents

award 0f their costs 0n appeal pursuant

are entitled t0 an

t0

Idaho

Appellate Rule 40.

ARGUMENT

III.

The
(1)

District

Court in

this case correctly applied the

Ms. Walsh’s cause 0f action accrued 0n February

agreement related to her February

8,

t0 the undisputed facts in holding

2015 when she executed the release

2013 accident claim; and

concealment provision 0f Idaho Code
lawsuit within one year of the time

5,

law

§

When

(2) that

even

if the

fraudulent

commence her

5-219(4) applied, Ms. Walsh did not

she knew, or in the exercise 0f reasonable care should

have been placed on inquiry, of her malpractice claim. Faced with CSA’S and Mr. Redd’s motion
for

summary judgment, Ms. Walsh

for

trial.

did not, nor can she, establish a genuine issue 0f material fact

This Court, therefore, must afﬁrm the decision of the District Court.

Standard 0f Review for

A.

“When a party appeals
same standard the

B Engineers,

Summarv Judgment

a district court’s grant 0f summary judgment, this Court applies the

district court

used When

it

ruled on the motion.”

Ina, 145 Idaho 719, 723, 184 P.3d 844, 848 (2008) (citing Camel]

Ina, 137 Idaho 322, 326, 48 P.3d 651, 655 (2002)).
“the

t0

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

judgment as a matter 0f law.” Idaho R. CiV.

When
facts in favor

BECO Const.

considering a motion for

Ca,

Inc.

v.

J- U-

v.

Barker Mgmt.,

Summary judgment must be

granted where

as t0

any material

fact

and the movant is

entitled

P. 56(a).

summary judgment,

0f the nonmoving party, and draw

all

10

the Court

must construe

all

disputed

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from

the record in favor of the

848.

The nonmoving

must

set forth

Idaho

at

nonmoving

party,

BECO Const.

party.

however, “‘may not

by afﬁdavit speciﬁc

facts

rest

1227 (1994)) “‘Summary judgment

is

upon mere

showing there

327, 48 P.3d at 656. (quoting Rhodehouse

C0., Ina, 145 Idaho at 723,

v.

Stutts,

appropriate where the

at

allegations in the pleadings, but

a genuine issue for

is

184 P.3d

trial.”’

125 Idaho 208, 21

1,

Camel], 137

868 P.2d 1224,

nonmoving party bearing

the burden

of proof fails t0 make a showing sufﬁcient to establish the existence of an element essential to the
party’s case.” Id. (quoting Jensen

779 (2001)). See also Baxter

v.

v.

Am. Suzuki Motor Corp, 136 Idaho 460, 463, 35 P.3d 776,

Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000).

Accrual 0f a Cause 0f Action for Professional Malpractice Under Idaho Code

B.

§ 5-219141

Idaho Code § 5-219 establishes a two year statute 0f limitations 0n “[a]n action to recover

damages

by

for professional malpractice, 0r for

an injury to the person, 0r for the death 0f one caused

the wrongful act or neglect of another, including any such action arising from breach 0f an

implied warranty or implied covenant;

.”
.

.

.

Idaho Code

§ 5-219(4).

This Court has held that “a

cause of action for professional negligence cannot accrue until some damage has occurred.” City

ochCall

v.

Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659, 201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009) (citing Stephens

v.

Stearns,

106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984)). “[T]he ‘some damage’ that has occurred must be

damage

that the client could recover

or an increase in the risk 0f damage

is

Rather, an action for professional malpractice

is

“Potential

Id.

harm

from the professional

objective proof that

an action for malpractice.”

Id.

not sufﬁcient t0 constitute some damage.”

deemed

would support the existence 0f some

11

in

actual

t0

have accrued

damage.”

Id. at

C“

when

there

is

660, 201 P.3d at

633 (quoting Chicoine
limitation period

is

v.

Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 487, 835 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1992)).

“The

not extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting

from the malpractice or any continuing professional or commercial relationship between the
injured party and the alleged wrongdoer.”

Lapham

v.

Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 586, 51 P.3d 396,

400 (2002).
“The determination 0f what
action

constitutes ‘damage’ for purposes 0f accrual 0f a cause 0f

must be decided on the circumstances presented

in each individual case.”

Bonz v. Sudweeks,

119 Idaho 539, 543, 808 P.2d 876, 880 (1991).

“[W]hat constitutes ‘objective proof” 0f the

existence of some

must be decided on the circumstances 0f each

damage

suffered

by the

client also

case.” Buxton, 146 Idaho at 662, 201 P.3d at 635.

“The time when

‘a

cause 0f action accrues

may

be a question 0f law 0r a question 0f fact, depending upon whether any disputed issues of material

Nerco Minerals C0.

v.

Morrison Knudsen Corp, 140 Idaho 144, 148, 9O P.3d 894,

898 (2004) (quoting Kimbrough

v.

Reed, 130 Idaho 512, 516, 943 P.2d 1232, 1236 (1997)).

fact exist.’”

“Where

there

is

n0 dispute over any

accrues, the question

at 148,

90 P.3d
C.

is

issue of material fact regarding

when

the cause of action

one 0f law for determination by the court.” Nerco Minerals C0. 140 Idaho
,

at 898.

The

Court correctlv determined that Ms. Walsh’s cause 0f action for
CSA and Mr. Redd accrued when she settled and
released her iniurv claim arising out 0f the Februarv 8, 2013 accident.
District

legal malpractice against

In this case,

Ms. Walsh released

all

of her claims for injuries arising out of the February

2013 automobile accident When she executed a Release 0f A11 Claims

12

in favor

8,

0f Troy Hansen and

Mr. Hansen’s

ANPAC, 0n

insurer,

established Idaho law, February 5,

February

5,

2015.

(See R, p. 160.)

2015 was the date on Which Ms. Walsh

recover any further amounts against Mr. Hansen or

ANPAC,

and this

By

statute

10st the opportunity to

the date

is

and clearly

on which damage

occurred.

This Court has concluded 0n more than one occasion that some damage has occurred for
statute

of limitation purposes when the rights of parties become ﬁxed and the plaintiff has

opportunity to recover
Killen

&

some amount from another party. For example,

Pittenger, P.A., 112 Idaho 357,

client’s cause

in Treasure Valley

0f action for legal malpractice was time barred Where the action dealt with an issue

amended Chapter

On August

24, 1982, the bankruptcy court

13 bankruptcy plan, awarding the principal

Bank’s claim, but making n0 mention 0f the bank’s right
at

initiated

by the

client’ s

The defendant in Treasure Valley Bank was required t0 ﬁle Treasure Valley Bank’s claims

with the federal bankruptcy court.
debtor’s

Bank v.

732 P.2d 326 (1987), the Court addressed Whether a

ofpost-conﬁrmation interest 0n a secured claim in a bankruptcy proceeding
debtor.

lost the

358, 732 P.2d at 327. Over a year

later,

t0

conﬁrmed

the

amount 0f Treasure Valley

post-conﬁrmation

interest.

112 Idaho

a dispute arose between the bank, the debtor and the

bankruptcy trustee regarding Whether the bank was entitled t0 post-conﬁrmation interest under the

approved Chapter 13 plan.
to clarify the question

of

Id.

its

The bank, through new

entitlement to interest; and on

judge denied the bank’s claim for post-conﬁrmation

any such claim prior

t0

counsel, ﬁled a motion in

December

interest, stating the

November 1983

12, 1983, the

bankruptcy

bank was required to make

August 24, 1982, when the bankruptcy plan was conﬁrmed. 112 Idaho

at

359, 732 P.2d at 328. In afﬁrming the district court’s grant 0f summary judgment in favor of the

13

attorney, the

13 plan

Supreme Court observed

that the

on August 24, 1982, “which ﬁxed the

bankruptcy court conﬁrmed the amended Chapter

rights

and obligations of the

parties.” Id.

The Court

stated:

a matter 0f federal law, TVB lost its opportunity t0 secure postconﬁrmation interest on the secured claim on August 24, 1982, and
that is the date upon Which damage occurred. The bankruptcy court

As

in

its

December

12, 1983, hearing did not adjudicate

TVB’S right t0
amended plan

but instead simply conﬁrmed that the
approved 0n August 24, 1982, had adjudicated that right, and the
court 0n December 12, 1983, refused t0 amend the plan.
interest,

Id.

The Court

further

commented 0n

P.2d 1293 (1992), in Which the Court

this

holding in Chicoine

v.

Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 835

stated:

was

some actual
damage when the bankruptcy court conﬁrmed the amended Chapter
13 bankruptcy plan without a provision for interest. As a matter 0f
law, the bank could not collect interest after that date. 112 Idaho at
359, 732 P.2d at 328. The existence of actual damage did not
depend on the bank knowing that it would not receive interest.
In Treasure

Valley, there

objective proof 0f

Chicoine, 122 Idaho at 487, 835 P.2d at 1298.
In the present case, the District Court concluded the

McCall

v.

Supreme Court’s decision

in City

Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009) was on par with the allegations

0f

at issue.

In Buxton, the Court addressed a claim that the City’s attorneys negligently advised the City to

release claims against

construction project.

its

project engineer (J-U-B Engineers, Inc.) arising

146 Idaho

at

Which the CitV released J-U-B from

from J-U-B’s

role in a

663, 201 P.3d at 636. This Court determined that the date on

liability

was

the date

14

0n Which the City

lost its right to

recover

against J-U-B, and the date on

which the damage occurred

the City to release J-U-B. Id.

The Court

if the attorneys

had negligently advised

stated:

had a claim against J—U—B, the City had
obj ectively ascertainable damage when it released that claim. At that
point, it gave up whatever cause 0f action it had against J—U—B. The

Assuming

statute

Id.

the City

of limitations began running

The Supreme Court

at that point.

Buxton further addressed a claim that the City’s attorneys negligently

in

advised the City t0 not accept an offer 0f settlement, holding that the City suffered objectively
ascertainable

offer

when

damage from

the offer

amount 0f the

was

the alleged negligence of the attorneys in advising

and the City, therefore,

rejected,

t0 not accept the

it

10st its opportunity t0 settle for the

offer. Id.

Ms. Walsh has engaged
decision in Buxton

by arguing

in

an effort in

for application

this case t0

avoid the implications 0f the Court’s

0f the “completed

Christian, 161 Idaho 577, 388 P.3d 591 (2017).

tort

theory” discussed in

Ms. Walsh’s argument

is

Molen

v.

premised 0n the

proposition that despite her settlement of the February 2013 accident claim and release of Mr.

Hansen and

Redd and

his insurer

from further

liability

0n February

5,

2015, her cause 0f action against Mr.

CSA could not accrue until the claims arising from her second May 2013

fully resolved in

October 2017,

directly saying so,

known before

Ms. Walsh

is

after the present malpractice action

was commenced. Without

essentially arguing that the full extent 0f her

damages had

her cause of action for legal malpractice could have accrued. This

with Idaho law.
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accident were

is

t0

be

not consistent

First, the

completed tort theory discussed in Molen

is

inapplicable t0 the case at bar.

dealt With the speciﬁc issue 0f accrual of a legal malpractice cause

and whether a malpractice cause of action could begin
exonerated

(i.e.,

580-82, 388 P.3d

at

presented in the case

that

was

of action in the criminal context,

to accrue before a criminal defendant is

whether adoption 0f the “exoneration rule” was appropriate under Idaho law).

Molen, 161 Idaho

ochCall v.

Molen

at bar.

at

591-96. Molen

is

distinguishable from the circumstances

Notably, in Molen the Supreme Court relied on the reasoning of City

Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009); however, the portion 0fthe Buxton case

relied

upon was not

the Court’s holding that addressed whether the attorneys

negligently advised the city to release

its

claims,

which

is

had

the issue in the case at bar. See Molen,

161 Idaho at 581, 388 P.3d at 595 (quoting from that portion 0f the Buxton decision referring t0

counts 0f the complaint other than the allegations that the attorneys negligently advised the city t0
release

its

limitations

claims against J-U-B).

began

It is

speciﬁcally the holding in Buxton that the statute of

on the date of the release

to run

(i.e.,

the date

recover) that applies to the circumstances in the present case.

Buxton

instructs that the

purposes, occurred

completion 0f the

When Walsh executed

tort (t0

on Which the

When

city lost its right t0

placed in proper context,

use Walsh’s terms) for statute 0f limitations

the release of claims arising

from her February 2013

2015, because that was the date on Which the rights 0f the parties became

accident on February

5,

ﬁxed and Walsh

her opportunity to recover any additional damages from Mr. Hansen and/or

his insurer

10st

ANPAC.

See also Treasure Valley Bank, supra (also focusing 0n the event Which ﬁxed

the rights and obligations of the parties as the point

limitations accrued).
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when damage

occurred, and the statute 0f

Furthermore, Ms. Walsh’s insistence that her claim against
speculative until her lawsuit against

Donald Lamott resolved

is

CSA

and Mr. Redd was

ultimately an effort t0 apply a

discovery rule to the question of When her cause 0f action accrued, Which this Court has rejected
as inconsistent with Idaho

Code

The Supreme Court has speciﬁcally “refused

§ 5-219(4).

engraft I.C. § 5-219(4) With a discovery rule.”

960, 964 (1994).

The Court has

Tingley

v.

Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 90, 867 P.2d

also indicated that Whether

does not depend upon the knowledge 0fthe injured party.

t0

damage

Lapham

v.

is

objectively ascertainable

Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 587,

51 P.3d 396, 401 (2002). The Court has recognized that “[t]0 require that the fact 0f damage must

be obj ectively ascertainable to the injured party would simply reinstate a discovery rule, which the
legislature has rejected.”

Lapham, 137 Idaho

at 587, 5

1

P.3d

at

401 (citing Hawley

Idaho 498, 788 P.2d 1321 (1990)). The phrase “‘objectively ascertainable’ does not
fact

of damage must have been known t0 the injured party, or that

from

facts

known by the

it

v.

Green, 117

mean that the

must have been ascertainable

injured party.“ Id.

In addition to the reasoning 0f the Court as set forth in the Buxton and Treasure Valley

Bank

cases described above, similar reasoning can be found in the Court’s decision in Fairway

Dev. C0.

v.

Petersen, Moss, Olsen,

Meacham

&

Carr, 124 Idaho 866, 865 P.2d 957 (1993).

Notably, Ms. Walsh ignores the import 0f the Treasure Valley

Bank and Fairway Development

cases t0 the issues before the Court; and, in fact, fails to even cite these cases in her brief.

Fairway Development,

this

In

Court held malpractice claims against tax attorneys for allegedly

1

There is also no requirement in Idaho law that an adverse ruling be obtained before a malpractice claim can
be pursued, nor does the law allow for tolling based upon the hope that a loss may be recovered. McColm-Traska v.
Baker, 139 Idaho 948, 953, 88 P.3d 767, 772 (2004); Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 586, 51 P.3d 396, 400 (2002).
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failing to appeal their client’s tax claims

trial

through proper administrative channels accrued

when the

court dismissed the client’s claims for failing to exhaust administrative remedies, and, thus,

the client lost

its

right t0 pursue tax assessment claims, regardless of

whether those claims were

ever found to have merit. 124 Idaho at 869, 865 P.2d at 960. Signiﬁcantly, the Court recognized

that

Fairway did not

until a

know the

exact amount 0f damage suffered due t0 the attorney’s malpractice

Board 0f Tax Appeals ruled

Fairway had appealed the

in Fairwav’s favor

district court’s dismissal

approximately nine months

later,

is

not the proper standard used t0 determine

know how much damage

when the

cause of action accrues. Because Fairway did not

dollars 0r

Which claims could be revived on appeal does not diminish the conclusion

some

actual

damage

[at the

time 0f the

that

of its tax claims. Nevertheless, the Court stated

“knowledge 0f the exact amount 0f damage suffered

suffered

and

trial

it

suffered in

that

Fairway

court’s dismissal 0f its claims] .” Id. (underline

emphasis added).
Thus, Ms. Walsh’s arguments linking the accrual 0f her cause 0f action against

Mr. Redd to What occurred in the Walsh
she needed to

know

the extent of her

v.

Lamott lawsuit are misplaced. She

damage

is,

CSA and

in effect, asserting

suffered due t0 the alleged premature settlement of

her injury claims arising from the February 2013 accident before her cause 0f action for
malpractice accrued. However, being able to determine the extent of the
the standard. A11 that

is

required

Ms. Walsh’s suggestion

is

damage

suffered

is

not

some damage.

that the statute

0f limitations under Idaho Code

§ 5-219(4) did not

accrue as 0f the date she released her claims arising from the February 2013 accident because

Donald Lamott might have accepted

full responsibility for all

18

0f Walsh’s damages for both

accidents, or that a jury could have

awarded the

full

measure 0f her damages,

Walsh’s speculation concerning what Mr. Lamott 0r a jury might have done
lawsuit

angle

—

is

nothing more than a veiled attempt t0

that the extent

the

of Ms. Walsh’s damages had t0 be

legal malpractice accrued. Again,

is

make

same

failed

known

is

equally unavailing.

in the

Walsh

v.

Lamott

argument from a different

before her cause 0f action for

Ms. Walsh’s knowledge concerning the extent of her damages

not the standard.

Ms. Walsh’s arguments

in this case concerning the proper accrual date for her malpractice

action introduce a morass 0f confusion between her

to her

May 2013

damage claims

as they

might have pertained

accident claim versus her February 2013 accident claim. Ms.

her malpractice claim against

summary judgment

Walsh summarized

CSA and Mr. Redd in her memorandum opposing their motion

for

as follows:

[T]he Defendants committed malpractice by settling the ﬁrst claim
Without fully investigating both claims and without obtaining a
global settlement.

By doing

Defendants not only settled the
than the damages the Plaintiff

so, the

ﬁrst claim for substantially less

from the ﬁrst collision; the Defendants also put at
and diminished the Plaintiff’s claims under the second incident
because Defendants left an ‘empty chair’ for the defendant in the
second case to blame.
actually suffered

risk

(R, p. 321.)

The “empty

injury claim arising

from the

motorist insurance that

Admission Nos.

chair” issue

was

6-9); R, p.

was rendered

May 2013

irrelevant

accident for the full value of the liability and underinsured

available for that claim.

(R, p. 106 (Responses to Request for

102 (Answer to Interrog. N0.

Walsh’s assertion that Mr. Redd and

by Ms. Walsh’s settlement 0f her

CSA

10).)

The only remaining claim was

“committed malpractice by
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settling the ﬁrst

claim

without fully investigating both claims and without obtaining a global settlement.”

Ms. Walsh’s damages
full

might have arisen from her receiving

in her malpractice action

value of insurance proceeds available t0 her With respect to the

settlement or jury verdict with regard t0 the

required in order for a determination t0 be

damages

as a result of acts 0r omissions

MaV 20 1 3

made

left

as t0 Whether, 0r to

by Mr. Redd and

an “empty chair” for Mr. Lamott

all

t0 point t0).

fact,

asserted against

CSA

less than the

2013 accident,
v.

either a

Lamott lawsuit was

extent,

Walsh sustained

diminished because Mr. Redd and

The same
If

and Mr. Redd

is

not true, however, 0f Ms.

Ms. Walsh had not received a

available insurance through the resolution 0f her

would n0 doubt have

What

the extent

CSA relative t0 that claim (i.e., Whether

Walsh’s claim concerning her February 2013 accident.
recovery of

May

accident in the Walsh

Walsh’s claim for damages against Donald Lamott was, in

CSA

T0

May

2013 accident claim, she

that she should

have received more

the settlement of her February 2013 claim because of the apportionment of her

damages

February 2013 accident that resulted in a diminished recovery against Donald Lamott. In

however, Walsh did receive a
claim, and she

still

fully investigated,

from

it

was

May

available insurance for her

May

damages she

Thus, Ms. Walsh’s action against Mr. Redd and

investigation, and, as a result,

from the

all

settled for substantially less than the

premise that the February 2013

attributable to the

recovery of

accident claim

was

Walsh did not recover

February 2013 accident. This

is

true

settled

all

too

CSA

that she should

t0 the

reality,

was not

actually suffered

rests entirely

early,

in

2013 accident

asserted a claim in this action that her February 2013 accident claim

and

that collision.

full

full

0n the

Without adequate

have for

injuries

no matter the outcome of her claim

arising

2013 accident. In the end, the only question becomes the extent 0f the damages
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sustained as a result of the alleged negligence 0f Mr.

the February

In

summary, the accrual 0f Ms. Walsh’s action

extent 0f

damage

accident claim.

settlement 0f

for legal malpractice in this case did not

May 2013

accident claim 0r otherwise, 0f the

allegedly resulting from the premature settlement 0f her February 2013

Regardless 0f the extent to Which Ms. Walsh’s injury claim resulting from the

February 2013 accident

may have had

merit and Whatever the amount 0f

that claim, she 10st the opportunity t0 pursue

ANPAC When she released that claim in February 2015.

0r

may not have

recovered as a result of the

2013 claim was prematurely

damage associated With

damages beyond the amount 0f the settlement Offered

by

the February

CSA relative to the

2013 accident claim.

depend 0n her discovery, through resolution of her
full

Redd and

May 2013

settled

The amount of damages Walsh may

accident

is

not the benchmark. Assuming

based upon negligent advice by Mr. Redd and

CSA as Ms. Walsh has claimed in this action, she sustained objectively ascertainable damage when
she lost her right to pursue a claim for additional damages against Troy Hansen and

her rights became ﬁxed as a result of entering into the February
District

Court correctly determined that February

5,

5,

2015

§

5-219(4).

commenced more than two
D.

and

Therefore, the

2015, was the date 0n which “some damage”

occurred and Walsh’s cause of action for legal malpractice against Mr.

under Idaho Code

release.

ANPAC

Redd and

CSA

accrued

Ms. Walsh’s cause of action against Mr. Redd and CSA,

years later on

March

2,

2017,

is

time-barred.

Even if the fraudulent concealment provision 0f Idaho Code 8 5-219(4) applies,
the District Court still correctlv held Ms. Walsh’s action was untimelv.
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At

the District Court level,

Ms. Walsh sought

t0 avoid application

of the two-year statute

0f limitations from the settlement date 0f her February 2013 accident claim by arguing

Mr. Redd fraudulently concealed

their malpractice.

asserting the District Court erred in concluding

Ms. Walsh continues

Ms. Walsh’s lawsuit was

such allegations 0f fraudulent concealment were taken as

1.

in this effort

still

CSA

and

on appeal,

time-barred, even if

true.

Law Addressing the Fraudulent Concealment Exception in Idaho
Code

§ 5-219141.

“[Idaho Code] Section 5—219(4) provides two exceptions to the ‘accrual on occurrence’

rule.

Cases involving foreign objects in the body and cases involving fraudulent concealment

accrue ‘When the injured party

knows

or in the exercise 0f reasonable care should have been put

on inquiry regarding the condition 0r matter complained
855, 702 P.2d 890, 893 (1985).

’”
of.

Pichon

v.

Benjamin, 108 Idaho 852,

“In these two types of cases, an action must be

commenced within

one year 0f the discovery of the wrongful act or within two years following the occurrence,
Whichever

is later.”

Id.

“Fraudulent concealment occurs ‘When the fact of damage has, for the purpose of escaping
responsibility therefor,

been fraudulently and knowingly concealed from the injured party by an

alleged wrongdoer standing at the time of the wrongful act, neglect or breach in a professional 0r

commercial relationship with the injured
fraudulent concealment exception

to

be treated

is

party....”’

Id.

(quoting Idaho

Code

§ 5—219(4)).

not an expansive, but, rather, a limited doctrine; and

like a discovery rule:
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it is

The
not

Unlike the discovery

rule,

which

tolls the

running of the limitations

period until plaintiff discovers the nature of his injury, or should

have discovered the nature of his injury through reasonable care and
diligence, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment suspends the
limitations period in light 0f defendant’s having concealed facts

necessary for plaintiff t0
effect 0f fraudulent

know

that his claim existed; the estoppel

concealment is not permanent, however, and

knowledge of facts that would make reasonable people inquire
about and discover the concealed cause 0f action is equivalent,
for limitations purposes, t0 knowledge 0f the cause 0f action.
32

Am.

Jur.

Periods §

1

Proof 0f Facts 3d 129 Proving Fraudulent Concealment

t0 Toll Statutory Limitations

(1995) (emphasis added). “Courts therefore tend t0 apply the doctrine narrowly and

with great care, and only in those circumstances that led t0

its

defendant’s actions foreclose any chance by the plaintiff t0 bring

creation—namely, When the
its

claim before the statutory

limitations period expires.” Id. at § 2.

“‘[W]here discovery of a cause of action commences the statute 0f limitations the date 0f
discovery

is

a fact question for the jury unless there

Bliss Valley Foods, Inc.

(quoting

McCoy

v.

v.

is

no evidence creating a question 0f fact.

Walker, 127 Idaho 12, 16, 896 P.2d 338, 342 (1995) (emphasis added)

Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 773, 820 P.2d 360, 368 (1991)).

limitation contained in the concealment exception begins t0 run

in the exercise

When the
Inc.

90,

v.

”’

when

“[T]he one-year

‘the injured party

knows or

of reasonable care should have been put on inquiry’ 0f the alleged malpractice, not

injured party

knows

or

was put on inquiry 0f ‘the

fact

of damage.

Walker, 127 Idaho 12, 896 P.2d 338 (1995). See also Tingley

v.

’”

Bliss Valley Foods,

Harrison, 125 Idaho 86,

867 P.2d 960, 964 (1994) (afﬁrming dismissal of legal malpractice action as time-barred Where

time

When plaintiffknew 0r was placed 0n inquiry of dismissal ofunderlying personal injury action

23

upon Which

legal malpractice action

was based was

indisputable).

See also Rita M.

CatholicArchbishop, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685, 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)Error!

(“The doctrine 0f fraudulent concealment
play, Whatever the lengths to

[for tolling the statute

which a defendant has gone

v.

Roman

Bookmark not deﬁned.

0f limitations] does not come into

t0 conceal the

wrongs,

if a plaintiff is

on

notice 0f a potential claim”).

2.

N0 genuine issue

0f fact exists in this case sufﬁcient to avoid

iudgment on the

issue 0f fraudulent concealment.

In the present case,

when

malpractice

that

Mr. Redd and

CSA knew

of their

they settled her claims pertaining t0 the February 2013 accident, but concealed

from Walsh. Walsh argues

the malpractice

ANPAC

Ms. Walsh has argued

summary

in February 2015,

CSA received

that at the time

0f her settlement with Mr. Hansen and

correspondence from counsel representing Blue Cross

0f Idaho, asserting subrogation rights and apportioning more than $60,000 0f Walsh’s medical
treatment and care t0 her February 2013 accident.

argues she did not

this litigation.

1H]

34-37.)

become aware of the correspondence from Blue Cross

(Id) She

Walsh argues

Redd concealed
malpractice.

(See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 20-21.)

made
that

the

same

it

was produced

in

assertion before the District Court. (See R, pp. 332-333

by concealing

the correspondence from Blue Cross,

the only “concrete information” available t0

(Appellant’s Brief, p. 21.)

Mr. Redd likely committed malpractice
counsel Kristian Beckett 0n 0r about

until

Walsh

She further
until

March

it

Ms. Walsh

asserts that she

that they

CSA

and Mr.

had committed

was not informed

CSA

was discovered and disclosed by her

and

current

25, 2016, in connection With her deposition taken in

24

the Walsh

v.

Lamott

lawsuit. (See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 22-23.)

action Within one year of that date,

First, the

Even
to

if the

0n March

2017, she argues her action was timely.

existence of the Blue Cross letters that

Walsh focuses on in her brief is

Court assumes the February 2015 Blue Cross

Ms. Walsh indicating Mr. Redd and

letters

2,

was

far

from the only

Because Walsh commenced her

letters

would have provided information

CSA had committed malpractice,

facts that

irrelevant.

the information in those

would have placed Ms. Walsh 0n inquiry concerning a

potential malpractice claim.

when

In addition, the standard for

fraudulent concealment exception

establishing malpractice as

may g0

may

apply,

§

5—219(4) begins t0 run,

Valley Foods, Inc.

v.

is

when

not

there

Walsh has suggested. Regardless 0f the

t0 conceal malpractice, the statute

Idaho Code

the statute 0f limitations accrues, even assuming the

is

“concrete information”

lengths t0

which a defendant

0f limitations accrues, and the one-year period under

when

the plaintiff

is

0n notice 0f a notential claim. Bliss

Walker, 127 Idaho 12, 896 P.2d 338 (1995) (“[T]he one-year limitation

contained in the concealment exception begins t0 run

when

‘the injured party

knows

exercise 0f reasonable care should have been put 0n inquiry’ 0f the alleged malpractice

As

discussed

at

0r in the

.

.

.

.”).

length in Respondents’ Statement 0f Facts above, there are clear and

unequivocal communications in the record, from Ms. Walsh’s counsel Mr. Beckett, of facts and

Mr. Beckett’s belief

that

CSA

and Mr. Redd’s handling 0f the settlement 0f Walsh’s February

2013 accident claim constituted malpractice. (See discussion under Section B.2. above.) As the
District

Court appropriately concluded, there were facts sufﬁcient to place one on inquiry 0f a

potential claim as early as June 2015,

When Mr. Beckett

25

advised Ms. Walsh that

it

was not a good

idea t0 settle one of two claims where the other

is still

pending in

overlapping injury, and further conveyed directly t0 Craig
malpractice in the handling 0f the claim.
place Ms.

is

Walsh 0n inquiry

the date

attributed

85%

See also R,

p. 541.)

his belief that there

At

notice 0f her malpractice claim existed

where there

medical care and

of her medical care and

Mr. Beckett

total

total

in his subsequent email t0 Craig

(R, p. 469.)

Notably, Dr. Frizzell’s

May

Swapp

IME

7,

2013

an

had been

on February 22, 2016, which

expenses to the February

expenses t0 the

is

the latest, facts sufﬁcient to

0n Which Mr. Beckett acknowledged receiving a report from Dr. Tyler

15% 0f Walsh’s

realized.”

(Id.

Swapp

litigation

collision,

8,

2013

Frizzell that

collision,

and

and When according

the “full measure 0f the malpractice

t0

was

report essentially adopts the apportionment

opinion previously rendered by Ms. Walsh’s treating chiropractor, Dr. John Gray, which had been

given to

CSA

alleged in her

at the

as far

back as September 2013. (See R, pp. 475-483; R,

Amended Complaint that the

time Mr.

Redd negotiated the

$120,000.00. (R, p. 32
present substantially

1]

new

98.)

total billed

p.

30 1W 74-78.) Walsh

expenses for medical care rendered to her

settlement 0f the February 2013 claim With

So, Dr. Frizzell’s opinion

ANPAC exceeded

on February 22, 2016 ultimately did not

information concerning apportionment 0f expenses being attributed to

Walsh’s February 2013 accident claim (15% of Which exceeded the amount of the settlement) that
Mr. Beckett did not already have from the time 0f his

initial

assignment t0 Ms. Walsh’s case in

June 2015.
In granting

CSA and Redd’s motion for summary judgment, the District Court agreed with

CSA and Mr. Redd that Mr. Beckett’s knowledge of the facts is properly imputed to Ms. Walsh as
his client.

It is

generally recognized as black letter law that “an attorney’s knowledge

26

is

imputed

to his client;

App. 2010)

.”
.

.

.

Strong

v.

Suffer County Bd. ofSup’rs, 115 Cal. Rptr.

(internal citations omitted).

knowledge 0f the attorney
attorney has actually

“is

knowledge

Notice t0 an attorney

0f,

(Ill.

App.

Ct. 1981).

notice t0 the client; and the

t0 the client.”

See also Irwin

v.

In re Marriage ofMierlak,

Department 0f Veterans Aﬂairs, 498

U.S. 89, 92 (1990) (“Under our system 0f representative litigation, ‘each party

by

the acts of his lawyer-agent and

be charged upon the attorney.’
(quoting Smith

1,

v.

is

”) (quoting

Link

limitations

v.

Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1880));

t0 the plaintiff’s attorney

and bar the

is

is

Wabash

R.

McKinney

v.

Ca, 370 U.S.
Waterman

S.S.

626, 634 (1962)

Corp, 925 F.2d

notice t0 the client”; ruling that information

would be imputed

t0 the plaintiff so as t0 trigger the statute

plaintiff’s personal injury claim).

The Supreme Court of Vermont,

to California law, has stated:

It

deemed bound

considered t0 have ‘notice 0f all facts, notice of Which can

4-5 (lst Cir. 1991) (“Notice t0 an attorney

conveyed

(Cal. Ct.

0r imputed t0, the client notwithstanding whether the

communicated such knowledge

426 N.E.2d 1010, 1012

is

3d 498, 509-10

follows, therefore, that notice to an attorney sufﬁcient t0 trigger

and Will bar a claim,
regardless of whether that information was actually communicated
to the client. Stalberg v. Western Title Ins. C0,, 27 Ca1.App.4th 925,
32 Ca1.Rptr.2d 750 (1994), provides a perfect illustration. There, the
court held that a slander-of-title action had accrued when the
plaintiffs’ attorney discovered that the defendant had drafted and
recorded a ﬁctitious easement, although the attorney had not
conveyed the information to his client. As the court explained,
“Since plaintiffs’ attorney ought t0 have
communicated this
information t0 plaintiffs, plaintiffs must be charged With knowledge
0f these facts.... Plaintiffs’ imputed knowledge
should have
caused plaintiffs t0 suspect that defendant had slandered their title.”
Id. at 752—53. Accordingly, the facts known t0 the plaintiffs’
the statute of limitations

is

imputed to the

27

client,

0f

citing

counsel “triggered the

which expired prior

Agency ofNatural Resources
Idaho law

is

commencement 0f

to the ﬁling

the limitations period,”

0f the claim.

Id. at

Towns, 724 A.2d 1022, 1025

v.

consistent With these principles. State

519, 525 (201 1) (noting prosecuting attorney

v.

753.

(Vt. 1998).

Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 531, 261 P.3d

was presumed t0 have known

the law);

Eby

v.

State,

148 Idaho 731, 736-37, 228 P.3d 998, 1003-04 (2010) (“Generally, parties are bound by the actions
(and failures to act)) 0f their attorneys”; also quoting Link
for the principle that “each party

t0

have notice 0f all

is

facts, notice

deemed bound by the

v.

acts

Wabash

420

to

App. 2012), review denied, (Mar. 20, 2013) (As
trial,

the defendant

considered t0 have ‘notice 0f all

is

0f Which can be charged upon the attorney.”); Henney
v.

conduct 0f the

Ca, 370 U.S.

of his lawyer-agent and

100 Idaho 739, 740, 605 P.2d 503, 504 (1979) (same); State
(Ct.

R.

is

“deemed bound by

facts, notice

Link v. Wabash R. C0. and Smith

v.

at

633-34,

considered

v.

Henney,

Overline, 154 Idaho 214, 296 P.3d

many

decisions pertaining t0 the

the acts 0f his lawyer-agent and

ofwhich can be charged upon the

attorney.

3”

is

(quoting

Ayer, cited above).)

Courts have also determined the knowledge 0f an attorney t0 be imputed to his client for
statute

of limitations purposes.

See Santangelo

v.

Bridgestone/Firestone, Ina, 499 Fed. Appx.

727, 729 (9th Cir. 2012) (statute 0f limitations began t0 accrue

knowledge 0f facts giving them reason

by

plaintiff’s attorneys

Murphy

v.

House]

was imputed

& House],

t0 suspect tire

t0 plaintiff

when

had

facts

because attorneys were acting as her agent);

client’s attorney

28

attorneys ﬁrst

might be defective; knowledge 0f such

955 P.2d 880, 884 (Wyo. 1998)

malpractice began t0 run at time

when plaintiff’s

(statute

had sufﬁcient

0f limitations for attorney
facts available t0 her t0

be

aware 0f a potential legal malpractice action; that knowledge was chargeable
0f the knowledge 0f his attorney, even
potential claim);

Dandorph

v.

if

not his own, client

Fahnestock

&

knew

t0 client

and by Virtue

0r had reason t0

know 0f

462 F.Supp. 961, 964 (D. Conn. 1979)

C0.,

(notwithstanding plaintiff” s statement in her afﬁdavit that attorney did not mention t0 her that she

had a possible claim for “churning”

in Violation

her attorney was imputed to her so that she

at

0f the Securities Exchange Act, the knowledge 0f

knew or reasonably should have known of the

situation

a time that resulted in her complaint being barred by the applicable statute 0f limitation);

Kunstman
where

v.

Mirizzi,

44 Ca1.Rptr. 707, 7 1 0

plaintiff was being represented

The record

(Cal. Ct.

by an

App. 1965)

attorney,

in the case at bar leaves

who

n0 doubt

is

that

(statute oflimitations barred

claim

charged With knowledge of the law).

Ms. Walsh’s

attorney,

Mr. Beckett,

recognized a malpractice issue immediately upon taking over Ms. Walsh’s case in June 2015.

informed Walsh of the problem of
consequences of doing
With Mr. Swapp.
least put

settling

so, at that time;

He

one 0f two overlapping injury claims, along with the

and he further raised his concerns about malpractice directly

As of June 2015, Ms. Walsh

and/or Mr. Beckett and/or both knew, or were at

0n inquiry, 0fthe alleged malpractice forming the basis 0f Walsh’s cause 0f action against

CSA and Mr. Redd in this case.
the applicable standard

219(4), and

when

the “full measure” 0f the malpractice

analyzing the fraudulent concealment exception to Idaho

knowing Mr. Beckett already had an apportionment opinion

when he was

ﬁrst assigned t0 Walsh’s case in June 2015,

Frizzell’s February 22,

malpractice.

Even though knowing

is

Code

not
§ 5-

similar to Dr. Frizzell’s

Ms. Walsh has acknowledged

that Dr.

2016 medical opinions provided “concrete information” establishing

Therefore, the conclusion that must be drawn

29

is

that

Ms. Walsh was put on inquiry

regarding Mr. Redd’s and

CSA’s

alleged malpractice

more than one year before commencing her

present action.
In similar fashion to her argument before the District Court,

appeal that actual knowledge of the fact 0f malpractice
malpractice has been committed)

is

case where fraudulent concealment

(i.e.,

Ms. Walsh

is

suggesting on

being told unequivocally that

required before the statute of limitations begins to accrue in a

The repeated references

is at issue.

in

Ms. Walsh’s brief to

CSA and Mr. Redd’s alleged concealment of correspondence from Blue Cross of Idaho, as well as
CSA and Mr. Redd likely committed malpractice until the

her position that she was not informed,

time of her deposition in the Walsh
attention

actual

knowledge requirement, Which

statute.

is

from the relevant issue and

The

trigger

under Idaho Code

v.

Lamott

lawsuit, in

March 2016,

are designed to divert

re-direct the Court’s thought process t0 incorporating this

is

S

clearly inconsistent with the

unambiguous language 0f the

5-219(4) for the statute 0f limitations commencing to run

not conﬁrmation of malpractice, but that point at Which a party should have been put on inquiry

of the alleged malpractice.
Finally,

Ms. Walsh argues

that

Mr. Beckett’s knowledge should not be imputed

because she was his client during a period while he was working for CSA, Which
accused 0f committing the malpractice and fraudulent concealment
difﬁculty with Ms. Walsh’s argument, however,

Where Mr. Beckett continued

t0 represent

is

that

it

is

t0 her

the law

ﬁrm

at issue in this case.

The

overlooks the actual nature of this case,

Ms. Walsh following

his departure

from CSA, With

full

knowledge of the alleged malpractice, and over the course 0f several months preceding the
expiration 0f the statute of limitations during

Which Mr. Beckett and Ms. Walsh had plenty 0f

30

opportunity to

commence

case that Mr. Beckett

this action.

was her

Mr. Beckett’s knowledge

attorney both during and after his

ﬁrm he

The

has

District

now

The

fact that

Mr. Beckett

sued 0n behalf of Ms. Walsh

Court in

this case

is

When Mr.

District

is

of Idaho Code

may have

at

it is

§ 5-219(4)’s

once been an employee

irrelevant.

concluded that Ms. Walsh knew or reasonably should have

CSA

been put 0n inquiry notice 0f her malpractice claim against
2015,

fact in this

employment With CSA; and

that is relevant in evaluating application

fraudulent concealment exception.

0f the law

Ms. Walsh simply cannot avoid the undisputed

and Mr. Redd as early as June

Beckett began representing her. The undisputed facts support this holding 0f the

Court and

it

should be afﬁrmed. However, even

if this

Court questions whether June 2015

too early, there can be n0 question that the statute of limitations accrued for purposes 0f the

fraudulent concealment exception under Idaho

2016

report.

Ms. Walsh’s action was

still

Code

§ 5-219(4) as

commenced more

0f Dr. Frizzell’s February 22,

than one year after that date, and as a

result is untimely.

E.

Walsh’s argument that Idaho Code S 5-219(4) is unconstitutionallv vague must

ﬂ

“[A] civil statute Will not be held void for vagueness

‘if it

can be given any practical

interpretation’ 0r if persons

of common intelligence ‘can derive core meaning from

Daughters ofldaho,

Idaho Lottery

(quoting

MDS Inv.,

Inc.

v.

L.L.C.

v.

State, 138

Com ’n,

it.”’

Sons and

142 Idaho 659, 662, 132 P.3d 416, 419 (2006)

Idaho 456, 461, 65 P.3d 197, 202 (2003); Olsen

Freeman Ca, 117 Idaho 706, 716, 791 P.2d 1285, 1295
unconstitutionality of a statute bears the burden of
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showing

(1990)).

its

v.

J.A.

“The party asserting the

invalidity

and must overcome a

strong presumption 0f validity.”

presumed

Olsen, 117 Idaho at 709, 791 P.2d at 1288.

generally

that legislative acts are constitutional, that the state legislature has acted Within

constitutional powers,

and any doubt concerning interpretation of a

favor of that Which Will render the statute constitutional.”

When

“It is

statute is t0

be resolved in

“[G]reater tolerance

Id.

its

is

permitted

addressing a civil or non-criminal statute as opposed t0 a criminal statute under the void for

vagueness doctrine.”

Id.

at

“A

716, 791 P.2d at 1295.

civil or

non-criminal statute

unconstitutionally vague if persons 0f reasonable intelligence can derive core

is

not

meaning from

it.”

Id.

In this case, the substance 0f Ms. Walsh’s argument

is

that Idaho

vague because 0f varying case law interpreting and applying the

overcome the strong presumption 0f validity, nor does
any practical interpretation or

from

that persons

it

statute.

Code

§ 5-219(4)

must be

This does not, however,

establish that the statute cannot

be given

of reasonable intelligence cannot derive core meaning

it.

Idaho Code

§

5-219(4) states in plain and unambiguous terms that a cause of action for

professional malpractice accrues “as 0f the time 0f the occurrence, act 0r omission complained 0f,

and the limitation period

damages

shall not

be extended by reason 0f any continuing consequences 0r

resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or

the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer.

.”
.

.

Id.

There

commercial relationship between

is

no reason

t0 believe a

person of

ordinary intelligence cannot derive meaning from this language. This Court, in applying the statute
t0 professional negligence actions, has held that “a cause

cannot accrue until some damage has occurred.” City

32

of action for professional negligence

ochCall

v.

Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659,

201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009)

(citing

Stephens

v.

Steams, 106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984)).

In doing so, the Court has recognized that “[t]he determination 0f what constitutes ‘damage’ for

purposes of accrual 0f a cause 0f action must be decided on the circumstances presented in each
individual case.”

Bonz

v.

Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 543, 808 P.2d 876, 880 (1991).

constitutes ‘objective proof” of the existence 0f

some damage

suffered

decided on the circumstances of each case.” Buxton, 146 Idaho
that there

may be

several reported decisions applying Idaho

at

Code

by

the client also

662, 201 P.3d at 635.

§

“[W]hat

must be

The

fact

5-219(4) in accordance With

the circumstances presented in each individual case does not render the statute unconstitutionally

vague. The fact remains that as applied to this case the statute
dispute over any issue 0f material fact in this case regarding

is

not vague. There

is

n0 genuine

When Ms. Walsh’s cause of action

accrued; and the Court, therefore, properly determined the question as a matter 0f law. See Nerco

Morrison Knudsen Corp, 140 Idaho 144, 148, 90 P.3d 894, 898 (2004) (quoting

Minerals C0.

v.

Kimbrough

Reed, 130 Idaho 512, 516, 943 P.2d 1232, 1236 (1997)).

F.

v.

Respondents are entitled

t0 recover their costs

0n appeal.

Respondents request an award 0f their costs in defending

this

appeal pursuant t0 Idaho

Appellate Rule 40. Idaho Appellate Rule 40 provides that “[w]ith the exception ofpost-conviction
appeals and appeals from proceedings involving the termination of parental rights or an adoption,
costs shall be allowed as a matter 0f course t0 the prevailing party unless otherwise provided

law 0r order 0f the Court.” I.A.R. 40(a). Respondents, therefore, are

entitled to

an award of their

costs in defending this appeal should this Court determine they are the prevailing parties.
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by

IV.

The

District

CONCLUSION

Court correctly determined in

this case that Appellant’s

claim was untimely

and barred by Idaho Code § 5-219(4). Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request
the Court afﬁrm the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in their favor.

DATED this 4th day of October, 2019.

K

POWERS FARLEY, PC

James

S.

Thomson,

II

— Of the Firm

Attorney for Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
hereby certify that on the 4th day of October, 201 9, an electronic cnpy nf Respondents’
Brief was served to each party listed below via iCourt and email:
I

Kristian S. Beckett

-

histianailbeckettlegglxom

James
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S.

Thomson,

II

